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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between transnational terrorism and the restrictiveness of immigration policies.
We argue that transnational terrorism may create incentives for governments to implement more restrictive
migration policies. First, more restrictive policies may make terrorism a more costly endeavor, discouraging
future terrorist activity. Second, voters may hold the government accountable for the increased insecurity and
economic instability terrorism produces; more restrictive migration policies may signal political resolve and
meet public demand for security-providing policies, consequently reducing the government’s chances of elec-
toral defeat. We provide an empirical analysis of the effect of transnational terrorism on migration policy
restrictiveness for a sample of 30 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. We find that a greater exposure to
transnational terrorism is associated with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations
regarding eligibility criteria and conditions. This finding is robust to different model specifications, estimation
methods, operationalizations of terrorism, and instrumental-variable approaches. It points to the securitization
of immigration, providing partial support for the notion that transnational terrorism incentivizes migration
policy change towards greater restrictiveness. However, the policy response appears to be surgical (affecting
only migration controls) rather than sweeping (and thus not influencing broader migration regulations) for the
countries in our sample.
Keywords
immigration, immigration policy, securitization, transnational terrorism
Introduction
A few days after his inauguration, on 27 January 2017,
US president Donald Trump issued Executive Order
13769 titled ‘Protecting the nation from foreign terrorist
entry into the United States’ (Trump, 2017); colloqui-
ally, this order became known as the ‘Muslim travel ban’.
Explicitly referring to the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001 (9/11), as
motivation for his actions, Trump ordered a number of
restrictions regarding immigration into the United
States, ranging from travel bans for citizens of certain
countries to the elimination of visa waiver programs and
stricter screening of refugees and potential migrants.
Trump’s actions hint at three important points that
are highly relevant to our study. First, terrorism1 can
have important policy consequences. Indeed, it has been
argued that the 9/11 attacks and subsequent terrorist
Corresponding author:
daniel.meierrieks@wzb.eu
1 We follow Enders, Sanders & Gaibulloev (2011: 321) who define
terrorism as the ‘premeditated use or threat to use violence by
individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order
to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of
a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims’.
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incidences in European countries have shaped interna-
tional cooperation as well as defense, security, privacy,
and foreign policy in many nations (e.g. Epifanio, 2011;
Messina, 2014; Neumayer, Plümper & Epifanio, 2014).
Second, there is a ‘memory’ associated with terrorism,
leading to long-run effects of terrorism on policymaking;
for instance, the 9/11 attacks are still relevant for policy
decisions over 15 years later. Third, Trump’s executive
order points to the securitization of immigration, mean-
ing that non-security issues – such as migration – are
linked to security concerns (Messina, 2014). While the
securitization of immigration is exemplified in Trump’s
executive order, it is also reflected in popular opinion.
For instance, a 2016 Gallup poll across 14 European
countries found that 66% of respondents believed ter-
rorism by non-residents to be a serious problem, while at
the same time 55% of respondents thought that migra-
tion is a similarly serious issue, with concerns about both
issues being strongly positively correlated.2
Motivated by this discussion, we study whether
migration policy indeed becomes more restrictive in
response to transnational terrorism.3 While informative,
existing research on the nexus between terrorism and
migration policies focuses on the impact of the 9/11
attacks, the post-9/11 era, or only examines changes in
individual countries (Epifanio, 2011; for an overview
see Messina, 2014). We add to this literature by pro-
viding a first systematic cross-country study of the role
of transnational terrorism in migration policy change,
using country-year data for 30 OECD countries for the
1980–2010 period. Importantly, this country sample
allows us to compare country cases where immigration
policies are relatively well developed, transnational ter-
rorism is prevalent, and migration issues are salient, so
that the securitization of immigration may indeed play
a role.
We argue that migration policies become more
restrictive in response to terrorism (i) because of security
considerations (where more restrictive policies make ter-
rorism a more costly endeavor) and (ii) because govern-
ments, held accountable for increased insecurity by the
electorate, respond to voters’ increased fear and demand
for security, so as to avoid electoral defeat. Our empirical
analysis shows that increased exposure to transnational
terrorism – especially when it involves casualties – is
associated with stricter migration control measures, but
not with stricter migration regulations regarding eligibil-
ity criteria and conditions. This finding is robust to dif-
ferent model specifications, estimation methods,
operationalizations of terrorism, and endogeneity con-
cerns. Our analysis thus provides partial support for the
notion of a securitization of immigration. However, the
policy response to the transnational terrorist threat
appears to have been surgical (affecting only instruments
of migration control) rather than sweeping (and thus not
affecting broader migration regulations), making the far-
reaching approach of the Trump administration the
exception rather than the rule.
The effect of transnational terrorism on
migration policy restrictiveness
Migration policy: Definition and dimensions
Following Helbling et al. (2017: 82) we define migration
policies as ‘government’s statements of what it intends to
do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or
orders) in regards to the selection, admission, settlement
and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the coun-
try’. These policies consist of two main dimensions:
migration regulations and migration controls (Helbling
et al., 2017: 85). While the former refer to binding legal
provisions that create or constrain rights such as eligibil-
ity criteria, the latter are mechanisms (e.g. the detention
of illegal migrants) that help monitor whether the migra-
tion regulations are actually adhered to. Using these def-
initions, below we first discuss the general relationship
between migration policy and transnational terrorism;
afterwards, we discuss whether transnational terrorism
may interact differently with migration regulations and
migration controls.
From transnational terrorism to migration policy
restrictiveness
A government may respond to transnational terrorism by
restricting migration policies to provide additional secu-
rity against future attacks. This argument is rooted in a
rational-choice framework of terrorism, where terrorists
(as rational actors) weigh the benefits of terrorism (e.g.
from achieving political objectives) against its costs (e.g.
due to capture), choosing to engage in terrorism only
when the former outweigh the latter (Schneider, Brück
& Meierrieks, 2015: 132–133). More restrictive migra-
tion policies may increase the costs of carrying out ter-
rorism. For instance, tougher migration controls may
2 https://news.gallup.com/poll/212405/terrorism-migration-trouble-
europe.aspx.
3 Terrorism is transnational when it concerns more than one country.
For example, the 9/11 attacks were transnational terrorism, with the
perpetrators hailing from several Middle Eastern countries and the
attacks occurring in the United States, victimizing thousands of US
and non-US citizens.
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warrant more expensive (forged) documents to avoid
detection (Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks, 2015). Simi-
larly, stricter migration regulations concerning labor
migration and asylum-seeking may make it more diffi-
cult (i.e. more costly) for terrorists to enter a foreign
country. If stricter migration policies sufficiently raise
the costs of terrorism, they may consequently discourage
terrorist activity by (rational) terrorist actors.
Whether restrictive immigration policies actually
reduce terrorism is, however, not clear, as this question
has hardly been addressed in the literature. Böhmelt &
Bove (forthcoming) provide first evidence that terrorism
can indeed ‘travel’ from one country to another via larger
migration populations; yet, they find that this only holds
for countries with very lax migration policies. Still, even
if governments do not know whether closing the borders
is an effective measure to actually increase security, more
restrictive migration policies may still be an attractive
policy option to curb the political fallout from terrorism.
The literature on electoral accountability and retro-
spective voting suggests that election outcomes also
depend on how voters evaluate the performance of an
incumbent government (e.g. de Vries & Giger, 2014).
The electorate may hold accountable the government for
the negative economic effects of terrorism such as
reduced investment and tourism (e.g. Sandler & Enders,
2008; Meierrieks & Gries, 2013) as well as for the fear
and other forms of psychological distress associated with
terrorism (e.g. Huddy et al., 2005: 595). That is, when
terrorism occurs voters are anticipated to punish the
government at the ballot box for its failure to provide
safety (a public good) and macroeconomic stability (Gas-
sebner, Jong-A-Ping & Mierau, 2008).
Indeed, there is ample evidence that terrorism affects
voting behavior and government stability. For instance,
Gassebner, Jong-A-Ping & Mierau (2008) show that
terrorism increases the probability of a government being
replaced after an election. Bali (2007) finds that the 2004
Madrid attacks influenced turnout and voting decisions,
leading to the replacement of the Spanish government.
Berrebi & Klor (2008) find that right-wing parties
receive more votes when Israeli localities are affected by
terrorism. Similarly, Getmansky & Zeitzoff (2014) show
that the mere risk of being victimized by a terrorist attack
already affects voting behavior.
Public demand for counterterrorism measures is likely
amplified by the mass-psychological consequences of ter-
rorism (e.g. increased psychological distress at the macro
level). Such cognitive processes may give rise to probabil-
ity neglect, with individuals tending to focus on bad out-
comes (e.g. getting killed in a terrorist attack) and
neglecting the extremely low probability of actually
being affected (Sunstein, 2003). When the danger of
an event is weighted much more strongly than its like-
lihood (as in the case of terrorism), the demand for
protection against this event is potentially excessive, fur-
ther compelling governments to take action to calm their
citizens (Sunstein, 2003).
To meet public demand for counterterrorism mea-
sures and avoid electoral punishment, a government may
consequently respond to terrorism by making migration
policies more restrictive.4 For one, more restrictive
migration policies may indeed produce security, thus
meeting public demand for policies that provide safety
or restore public confidence in the ability of the govern-
ment to do so. For another, restricting migration may
also be an attractive option because it is associated with
low political costs, given that the group most strongly
affected by such policies (the migrants) has little political
say. What is more, governments may resort to ‘scape-
goating’, capitalizing on feelings of xenophobia in the
electorate that result from terrorism to justify tighter
migration policies. Indeed, several studies have shown
that terrorist attacks may lead to more negative attitudes
towards immigrants and increase support for more
restrictive immigration policies (e.g. Huddy et al.,
2005; Legewie, 2013).
To summarize, we hypothesize that more transna-
tional terrorism is associated with a higher likelihood of
adopting more restrictive migration policies (i) because
such policies may increase the material costs of carrying
out transnational terrorism (e.g. by making it more dif-
ficult for terrorists to infiltrate a country) and (ii) because
the government wants to avoid electoral defeat, given
that terrorism produces grievances (fear, economic
instability, etc.) for which the electorate will hold it
accountable.
From transnational terrorism to stricter migration
regulations and controls
So far, we have discussed the general relationship
between transnational terrorism and migration policy
responsiveness. However, as stressed above, migration
policy can be disaggregated into the dimensions of
migration regulations and migration controls. Here, it
is a priori unclear whether one dimension should be
4 Of course, the government has a battery of additional policy
responses at hand, ranging from expansive anti-terrorism legislation
to foreign military interventions (for overviews of counterterrorism
measures see Epifanio, 2011; Schneider, Brück & Meierrieks, 2015).
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more responsive to transnational terrorism than the
other. On the one hand, more transnational terrorism
could have similar effects on both policy dimensions. For
instance, to raise the costs of terrorism according to a
rational-choice framework, policymakers could plausibly
increase these costs both by tightening migration regu-
lations (e.g. by introducing quotas with respect to immi-
gration) and by intensifying migration controls (e.g. by
requiring more comprehensive identification documents
for immigrants).
On the other hand, more transnational terrorism may
have larger effects for migration controls. First, migration
controls are more directly related to border control, so
that they may more meaningfully increase the costs of
terrorism when tightened. For instance, relevant migra-
tion controls may include information sharing between
states and sanctions for airline carriers that enable irre-
gular migrants to enter another country. What is more,
migration controls may respond more notably to terror-
ism because they are more visible to the average voter.
When policy visibility is high, it is easier for voters to
connect those policies to the political process (Gingrich,
2014), in turn making it easier for the government to
reap the electoral rewards when such policies are popular.
In case of tighter migration controls, the average voter
may perceive them when, for example, traveling or
requesting a new passport; this visibility of migration
controls will then enable citizens to connect such mea-
sures to government responses to transnational terror-
ism. By contrast, more restrictive immigration
eligibility criteria (e.g. stricter labor requirements for
potential migrants) are not necessarily known by the
average citizen, nor do they play any role in their daily
life. Consequently, this may make it less likely that
tightening migration regulations in response to transna-
tional terrorism translates into voter approval.
In sum, we therefore hypothesize that (i) transnational
terrorism is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting
more restrictive migration regulations and controls because
both policy dimensions may similarly impact the terror-
ists’ calculus and a country’s political climate or, alter-
natively, that (ii) transnational terrorism is especially
associated with a higher likelihood of adopting more restric-
tive migration controls (rather than migration regulations)
because migration controls may more strongly affect the
terrorists’ calculus and voter approval.
Data and methodology
To test whether transnational terrorism is associated with
a higher likelihood of adopting more restrictive migra-
tion policies, we collect country-year data for 30 OECD
countries for the 1980–2010 period. The countries in
our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. This sample is chosen due to the availability of
data concerning country-specific immigration policies,
which we describe below in more detail. The summary
statistics are reported in Table I.
Dependent variable
To measure a country’s immigration policy choices, we
draw on the Immigration Policies in Comparison
(IMPIC) dataset (Helbling et al., 2017). This dataset
Table I. Summary statistics
Variable N*T Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Migration regulation 900 0.184 0.388 0 1
Migration controls 900 0.169 0.375 0 1
Transnational terrorism index (ITERATE) 900 0.281 2.009 0 48.035
Domestic terrorism index (GTD) 900 0.378 0.916 0 8.512
Transnational terrorism index (GTD) 900 0.293 1.408 0 23.973
Left-wing government 900 0.358 0.480 0 1
Right-wing government 900 0.452 0.498 0 1
Government size 900 17.066 4.922 6.794 41.994
Unemployment 858 7.226 3.983 0.2 24.21
Per capita income (logged) 881 10.231 0.668 8.270 11.626
Democratic participation 900 0.579 0.145 0.040 0.810
National election 900 0.310 0.462 0 1
Political affinity to the West 840 –0.841 0.770 4.272 1.599
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provides the first encompassing data collection on the
degree of restrictiveness of immigration policies in 33
OECD countries5 for the period 1980–2010. Besides
its exceptionally large temporal and geographical cover-
age, this dataset also allows us to differentiate between
migration regulations and migration controls, so that we
can also study whether (more visible) border control
mechanisms are more affected than (more general)
immigration regulations. More information on the exact
regulations and controls included in the IMPIC dataset
is provided in the Online appendix (supplementary
Table 1).
In the IMPIC dataset, migration regulations are asso-
ciated with the three main channels through which
migration occurs: labor migration, migration due to fam-
ily reunification, and migration by asylum-seekers and
refugees (Helbling et al., 2017: 85). These regulations
are binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights
and cover eligibility criteria and conditions. ‘Eligibility
criteria’ are requirements a migrant has to fulfill to qua-
lify for a certain entry route, whereas ‘conditions’ refer to
additional requirements that need to be fulfilled. For
example, labor migration regulations measured by
IMPIC account for migration quotas or age limits for
potential labor migrants (as eligibility criteria) and for
minimum language skill requirements (as an additional
condition associated with labor migration).
According to internal validity tests reported in Schmid
& Helbling (2016), regulations associated with labor,
family, and refugee migration constitute a comprehen-
sive and consistent dimension of immigration policy-
making. We thus follow their proposed aggregation
method to create a unified migration regulation variable,
‘[combining] regulations of family, labor, and asylum
immigration policies [into] one dimension, [ . . . ] using
unweighted arithmetic means to allow for symmetric
substitutability’ (Schmid & Helbling, 2016: 22). Then,
our first dependent variable is the change in migration
regulation; this variable is coded 1 when there is a change
towards more restrictive regulations in the unified migra-
tion regulation variable for a country-year pair and 0
otherwise.
Our second dependent variable is the change in migra-
tion controls; this variable is coded 1 when there is a
change towards more restrictive controls and 0 other-
wise. In the IMPIC dataset, migration control mechan-
isms include, for example, the establishment of registers
of aliens, the collection and sharing of biometric infor-
mation on migrants, detention of illegal migrants, and
sanctions against firms that employ illegal migrants or
airlines that transport foreign passengers lacking relevant
documentation (Helbling et al., 2017). Validity tests
have shown that control mechanisms constitute a migra-
tion policy dimension different from immigration regu-
lations (Schmid & Helbling, 2016), making it
meaningful to study separately the effect of transnational
terrorism on migration regulation and migration con-
trols. Indeed, the correlation between our two dependent
variables is very low (r ¼ 0.08, p ¼ 0.02).
Main explanatory variable
To indicate a country’s exposure to transnational terror-
ism, we first construct a preliminary terrorism variable
(premterror) for country i at year t:
premterrorit ¼ 1  attackit þ 4 woundedit þ 8  killedit
ð1Þ
We then use this preliminary index to create our index
of transnational terrorism memory (henceforth transna-
tional terrorism index, terrorit). This index is constructed
as follows:
terrorit ¼ 1  premterrorit þ
1
2
 premterrorit1
þ 1
3
 premterrorit2 þ
1
4
 premterrorit3
þ 1
5
 premterrorit4 þ
1
6
 premterrorit5
þ 1
7
 premterrorit6 þ
1
8
 premterrorit7
þ 1
9
 premterrorit8 þ
1
10
 premterrorit9
ð2Þ
Regarding this index and its construction, several
remarks are necessary:
(i) In Equation (1), attack refers to the number of
transnational terrorist attacks; wounded and
killed refer to the individuals wounded or killed
in these attacks per country-year observation.
Data on transnational terrorism is drawn from
the International Terrorism: Attributes of Ter-
rorist Events (ITERATE) dataset (Mickolus
et al., 2016). As a robustness check, we also use
5 As of 2019, there are 36 OECD countries. IMPIC does not include
data for three of them (Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia). We drop an
additional three (Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia) from our
sample to balance it. Importantly, all of these countries have
experienced almost no transnational terrorism since gaining their
independence in the 1990s.
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data on transnational terrorism from Enders,
Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011) and Gaibulloev
& Sandler (2019b); these authors create trans-
national terrorism series using data provided
by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)6
which itself does not report transnational
terrorism separately. Enders, Sandler & Gai-
bulloev (2011) argue that ITERATE mea-
sures transnational terrorism more
consistently than GTD; therefore, ITER-
ATE is our main data source.7
(ii) For our analysis we only consider transnational
attacks carried out by terrorists operating out-
side their country of origin. For instance, we
include attacks by the Algerian Groupe Islami-
que Armé (GIA) in France, but do not consider
attacks by the German Red Army Faction
(RAF) against US targets in Germany (even
though the latter attack also counts as a trans-
national terrorist incident in ITERATE). We
do so because regarding immigration policies
we expect policymakers to respond differently
to ‘imported’ transnational terrorism (as, e.g. by
the GIA) than to ‘homegrown’ terrorism with
transnational ramifications (as, e.g. by the
RAF).8 In particular, we expect policymakers
to tighten migration policies only when facing
‘imported’ transnational terrorism, given that
only this subtype of transnational terrorism
may be plausibly curtailed by stricter immigra-
tion policies.
(iii) The weighting scheme in Equation (1) is chosen
in a way that the ferocity of terrorism matters
more strongly than its frequency. We expect
more vicious terrorist attacks to receive wider
media attention (e.g. Rohner & Frey, 2007) and
infuse more fear into targeted societies than ter-
rorism that does not produce casualties. Conse-
quently, public pressure on politicians to effect
migration policy change ought to be stronger
when terrorism is especially ferocious. As a
robustness check reported below, we also con-
sider a different weighting scheme.
(iv) Our main explanatory variable, the index of
transnational terrorism memory, accounts for the
occurrence of transnational terrorism in the
contemporaneous period (t) and weighs it the
most. Importantly, the index also accounts for a
country’s history of transnational terrorism by
including information on past terrorism. This
aggregation reflects the ‘memory of terrorism’,
that is, the fact that past terrorism still shapes
present perceptions of transnational terrorism
risk. For instance, past terrorism could still
affect present (perceived) exposure to terrorism
through continuing media coverage, memor-
ials, the treatment of past terrorism in the arts,
and through narratives that persists within
communities. At the same time, we assume that
there is a certain decay associated with the
‘memory of terrorism’, so that our index
weights terrorist activity that occurred closer
to the present more strongly. This idea is rooted
in psychological research on ‘forgetting curves’,
where memory decay is a function of time (e.g.
Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991).9
Figure 1 shows that social exposure to transnational
terrorism was especially influential during 1980–91
Figure 1. Transnational terrorist activity, 1980–2010
6 The GTD is available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
7 Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011: 322) note that inconsistencies
in the GTD may have a number of sources such as missing GTD data
for the year 1993 and coding rules having been changed between the
1970–97 and post-1997 periods.
8 Due to data constraints, we cannot distinguish between ‘imported’
and ‘homegrown’ transnational terrorism when using GTD.
Consequently, for our sample there are approximately 1,900
‘imported’ transnational terrorist attacks when using ITERATE,
but over 3,800 ‘imported’ and ‘homegrown’ transnational attacks
when using GTD.
9 Given that there is disagreement over the exact functional form of
memory decay – especially when generalizing to ‘social memory’ and
‘social forgetting’ – as a robustness check reported below, we consider
alternative forms of memory decay.
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(reflecting the Cold War-era wave of left-wing terrorism)
and the 2001–10 period (reflecting a wave of religious-
Islamist terrorism), with a relative lull between 1992 and
2000. Figure 1 also shows the difference between our
terrorism index and observational data on transnational
terrorism. For instance, in contrast to observed terrorist
activity (plotted in Figure 1 as the mean number of
transnational terrorist incidents per year), our index does
not wane quickly after 2001, suggesting that the social
memory of terrorism may have still strongly influenced
public discourse for the remainder of the 2000s.
Model and controls
Empirical model. We examine the effect of transna-
tional terrorism on the change of migration policies
(towards more restrictiveness) using the following
model:
polchangeq;it ¼ /0 þ b1  terrorit1 þ b 0 X 0it1
þ g1  time1 þ g2  time2 þ g3  time3 þ Eit
ð3Þ
For country i at year t polchange in its q-form refers to
a binary dependent variable coded as 1 for the positive
outcome of a tightening of migration regulations or to a
binary dependent variable coded as 1 for the positive
outcome of a tightening of migration controls. For these
dependent variables the binary logit regression model is
appropriate, which allows us to examine how a set of
explanatory variables – the transnational terrorism index
(terror) and a vector of controls (X) – affects the prob-
ability of a policy change occurring (Long & Freese,
2006). As a robustness check, we also report the results
for the baseline model using OLS.10 We lag all variables
by one year because we assume that changes in the expla-
natory variables affect the policy outcomes only after
some time, for example because of parliamentary
procedures.
Controls. As for the vector of controls, we first account
for the effect of policy diffusion. It is operationalized as
the mean of the dependent variable for all countries net
of the policy change in the respective country of interest.
We expect migrants to select their target destination also
with respect to migration policies, choosing countries
where policies are more lenient. Consequently, countries
may then become involved in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ (i.e.
becoming more restrictive) to avoid administrative, eco-
nomic, and political costs that may otherwise be associ-
ated with increased immigration.
Second, we control for governments’ ideological orien-
tation. We include two separate dummy variables that
take on the value 1 if the party of a country’s chief
executive officer has a left-wing or right-wing orienta-
tion, respectively; therefore, a centrist orientation is the
reference group. Data on ideological orientation are
drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI)
of Beck et al. (2001). Natter, Czaika & de Haas (2018)
find that partisan affects vary according to types of
migration policies and migrant categories considered.
Thus, we remain agnostic about the expected effect of
government ideology on migration restrictiveness.
Third, government size is operationalized as the share
of government consumption to total GDP, with the data
coming from the Penn World Table (PWT) (Feenstra,
Inklaar & Timmer, 2015). A larger government share
ought to coincide with a larger welfare state (i.e. more
public spending on health, education, social benefits,
etc.). We expect government size to positively predict
policy change towards more restrictiveness because
restrictive immigration policies may serve to protect the
‘closed system’ of the welfare state against external influ-
ences (e.g. the cross-border flow of labor).
Fourth, data on the unemployment rate is drawn from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World
Bank, 2016). When unemployment is low, there ought
to be a stronger demand for labor, leading to more
lenient immigration policies to satisfy this demand.
Conversely, when unemployment is high, there is little
demand for (foreign) labor; at the same time, public
opinion is expected to more strongly favor restrictive
immigration policies to protect domestic employees
from foreign competition.
Fifth, we control for a country’s level of per capita
income, using data from the PWT. Similar to the
unemployment rate (which reflects short-run macro-
economic dynamics), we expect higher per capita
income levels (which reflect long-run economic suc-
cess) to predict more restrictive policies. Here, richer
countries are anticipated to pursue such policies to
protect their prosperity.
Sixth, we control for a country’s quality of democratic
institutions, employing an index of participatory democ-
racy drawn from the V-DEM Dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2018). This index indicates how strongly citizens can
influence government policy, for example through tools
of direct democracy, engagement in civil society
10 Employing additional alternative estimators (e.g. the probit or
rare-events logit estimators) does not yield findings that are
different from those reported in the article.
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organizations or subnational elected bodies. We expect
greater democratic participation to positively predict
more restrictive migration policies. For instance, more
means of participation may enable political parties with
anti-immigration agendas to influence migration policies
more easily, for example via referenda.
As a robustness check, we amend our baseline model
with two additional controls.11 First, we control for the
effect of the 9/11 attacks which are an obvious outlier
(also visible in Figure 1). We model this outlier by
including a dummy variable that takes on the value of
1 for the years after 2001 for the United States. Second,
we control for the timing of national elections, that is,
elections for national parliaments and (in case of direct
elections) for the head of the executive, with the data
coming from the DPI. On the one hand, experiencing an
election may lead to more restrictive migration policies,
especially when migration is a ‘hot-button issue’. On the
other hand, terrorist organizations may strategically plan
their attacks around elections to maximize political
impact (Aksoy, 2014).
Finally, to control for time dependence, we follow
Carter & Signorino (2010) and include time1, time2, and
time3, where time refers to the number of years since the
last policy restriction was observed. For instance, the
inclusion of these time controls ought to account for
the fact that countries with a history of past policy
restrictions may be more prone to a further tightening
of these policies in the future (e.g. due to the role of
persistent political cultures). Not accounting for time
dependence would violate the independence assumption
of the logistic regression model, potentially yielding mis-
leading results (Carter & Signorino, 2010).
Empirical results
Baseline results
The empirical results from our baseline specifications are
reported in Table II. With respect to our main explana-
tory variables of interest, we find that – regardless of
which specification is run and which data source is used
to measure terrorism – higher values of the terrorism
index are associated with more restrictive migration con-
trols. In terms of substantiveness, the odd-ratios from
Specification (6) suggest that a one-unit increase in the
terrorism index increases the likelihood of tighter migra-
tion controls by approximately 2.5%. By comparison, a
one unit increase in unemployment increases the like-
lihood of tighter migration controls by approximately
8.4%. By contrast, we do not find that higher levels of
the terrorism index are associated with more restrictive
migration regulations.
These findings provide partial support for our main
hypothesis: a history of transnational terrorism incenti-
vizes migration policy restrictiveness. However, the pol-
icy response appears to be surgical (affecting only the
restrictiveness of migration control) rather than extensive
(and thus not influencing broader migration regula-
tions). This may speak to our earlier discussion that
stricter migration controls may be the preferred policy
response to transnational terrorism because they are
more likely to affect the terrorists’ calculus (e.g. by nature
of being more closely related to border crossings and
control) and to increase (feelings of) security among cit-
izens due to their visibility. In addition to that, govern-
ments may be more reluctant to exacerbate migration
regulations in response to transnational terrorism
because these stricter regulations may reduce the supply
of labor migrants, creating adverse macroeconomic
effects, especially when labor is scarce; such economic
considerations may reduce incentives for office-holders
to overly limit migration.12
Considering the controls, our findings are as expected.
First, there is evidence of a diffusion effect taking the
form of a ‘race-to-the-bottom’. Moves towards more
restrictive migration policies in other OECD countries
increase the likelihood of increased restrictiveness also in
the country of interest. Second, there is no clear effect of
government ideology on migration policies. Left-wing
governments tend to implement stricter migration poli-
cies (potentially to protect domestic labor markets),
while right-wing governments are somewhat less likely
to implement stricter migration controls compared to
their centrist counterparts. In general, these findings
speak to Natter, Czaika & de Haas (2018) who also find
that the effect of government ideology on migration
11 We also consider the influence of further socio-economic
(economic growth rates, trade openness, education, etc.), political
(e.g. the prevalence of a presidential system), and demographic
variables (urbanization, population growth, population density, old-
age dependency ratio, etc.). Using these additional controls, however,
does not change the main findings reported in this article.
12 We thank a reviewer for making this point. In addition to
economic concerns, the government may also refrain from a
broader policy response (where both migration controls and
regulations are tightened) because public demand for such policies
may not be too large. Some studies suggest that the effects of terrorist
attacks on attitudes (e.g. xenophobia, fear) tend to be small, short-
lived, and matter only to certain groups of people (e.g. Legewie,
2013).
Helbling & Meierrieks 571
policies is non-trivial. Third, economic factors share
some association with migration policymaking: higher
levels of unemployment and higher income levels tend
to predict more restrictive regulations and controls.
These findings are consistent with the notion that coun-
tries may use migration policies to protect domestic labor
markets and prosperity. Fourth, the 9/11 variable pre-
dicts tighter migration regulations and controls; account-
ing for the 9/11 outlier, however, does not affect our
main finding. Fifth, further controls for government size
(as an indicator of the welfare state) and political condi-
tions (democratic participation, timing of elections)
share no robust association with a country’s choice to
make its migration policies more restrictive. Finally,
with respect to the controls for time dependence (time,
time2, and time3), a graphical representation of the
hazards (shown in Online supplementary Figures 1 and
2) – where the probability of policy change is plotted as
a function of time – shows the probability of policy
change decreasing with time for our migration regula-
tion measure but increasing with time for the migration
control measure.
Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we assess whether our findings are
affected by different operationalization of our terrorism
index. For one, using a different weighting scheme may
affect our results. We construct a different index where
the ferocity of transnational terrorism (i.e. the number of
individuals wounded or killed in an attack) is no longer
weighted more strongly than the frequency of terrorism.
For another, different assumptions about the ‘memory of
terrorism’ (i.e. the extent to which past transnational
terrorist activity affects the present) may matter. There-
fore, we consider three different types of ‘terrorism mem-
ory’ decay: a first one where memory decays more slowly
compared to our baseline indicator and in a linear way; a
Table II. Effect of transnational terrorism risk perception on migration policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable
!
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Transnational
terrorism index
–0.003 –0.001 –0.003 –0.002 –0.002 0.025** 0.026** 0.024** 0.003* 0.040*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.003) (0.059) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.020)
Policy diffusion 2.781** 2.717** 2.784** 0.486** 2.780** 2.058* 1.951 2.029* 0.267* 2.061*
(0.874) (0.868) (0.871) (0.151) (0.870) (1.009) (1.018) (1.019) (0.129) (1.012)
Left-wing
government
0.566* 0.563* 0.566* 0.087 0.566* –0.056 –0.059 –0.055 0.013 –0.069
(0.276) (0.275) (0.275) (0.043) (0.271) (0.339) (0.340) (0.340) (0.048) (0.341)
Right-wing
government
0.350 0.319 0.350 0.050 0.349 –0.484* –0.527* –0.483* –0.053 –0.490*
(0.256) (0.261) (0.256) (0.039) (0.250) (0.242) (0.242) (0.243) (0.033) (0.244)
Government size 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.001 0.021
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.005) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.002) (0.020)
Unemployment 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.006 0.052 0.080*** 0.080** 0.081** 0.010* 0.081**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.004) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.004) (0.029)
Per capita income 0.940** 0.926** 0.940** 0.119** 0.940** 0.468*** 0.457** 0.475** 0.053** 0.464**
(0.204) (0.206) (0.206) (0.040) (0.203) (0.161) (0.163) (0.158) (0.018) (0.161)
Democratic
participation
0.924 0.909 0.925 –0.038 0.924 0.048 0.032 0.022 –0.066 0.095
(1.479) (1.488) (1.484) (0.202) (1.448) (1.092) (1.103) (1.084) (0.106) (1.099)
9/11 0.746** 1.052**
(0.196) (0.151)
National election –0.015 0.131
(0.177) (0.178)
Terrorism data ITERATE ITERATE ITERATE ITERATE GTD ITERATE ITERATE ITERATE ITERATE GTD
Estimation
method
Logit Logit Logit OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit OLS Logit
Time controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Pseudo-R2 or
Adjusted R2
0.074 0.075 0.074 0.053 0.074 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.023 0.040
No. of
observations
827 827 827 827 827 827 827 827 827 827
Constant not reported. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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second one where memory decays more quickly and
exponentially; and a third one where there is no ‘terror-
ism memory’, so that past experiences of transnational
terrorism do not affect present perceptions.13
The results using the alternative operationalizations of
the terrorism index are reported in Table III. First, we
find that applying a different weighting scheme does not
affect our baseline findings (Specifications (1) and (5) of
Table III). We still find that more social exposure to
terrorism makes it more likely that migration controls
are tightened, while it does not matter to migration reg-
ulation change. Second, different assumptions about the
form of the decay of ‘terrorism memory’ do not alter our
baseline results (Specifications (2), (3), (6), and (7) of
Table III). However, when we assume that there is no
‘terrorism memory’ (Specifications (4) and (8) of Table
III), we find that there is no effect of transnational ter-
rorism on both migration policy measures. However, we
believe this lack of ‘terrorism memory’ to be highly
implausible. For instance, this very strict assumption
would mean that the 9/11 attacks were no longer
policy-relevant after 2002; as highlighted in the intro-
duction, recent migration policy choices by the Trump
administration show that this is clearly not the case.
Next, we examine whether our main finding is driven
by the frequency or ferocity of transnational terrorism.
To do so, we use the three constituent parts of our
terrorism index as individual regressors, assuming the
baseline decay of ‘terrorism memory’ as defined in Equa-
tion (2). As reported in Table IV, we find that no mea-
sure of transnational terrorism memory affects migration
regulation change. This finding is consistent with earlier
results. By contrast, our findings indicate that a greater
ferocity of transnational terrorism affects migration con-
trol policy change, while its frequency does not matter.
For instance, this latter finding may suggest that more
bloody attacks are more successful in instilling fear and
producing economic instability and media attention,
thus creating stronger incentives for the governments
of attacked countries to respond by tightening migration
controls.
Endogeneity
Potentially, the results reported above are affected by
endogeneity. The most likely source of endogeneity is
simultaneity. Simultaneity would imply that migration
policies also affect transnational terrorism. For instance,
(more) restrictive migration policies may induce feelings
of injustice abroad, contributing to frustration and facil-
itating terrorist activity (Böhmelt & Bove, forthcoming).
To address potential endogeneity concerns, we esti-
mate a series of simultaneous-equations instrumental-
variable probit models, following Rivers & Vuong
(1988). In the reduced-form equation we regress the
terrorism index (our potentially endogenous variable)
on an instrumental variable and the baseline controls,
while simultaneously estimating the structural equation
(probit model), therefore controlling for endogeneity
(Rivers & Vuong, 1988).
Instrumental variable. Our instrumental variable mea-
sures a country’s political affinity to the West, where the
term ‘West’ as a shortcut refers to the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany as the most
important Western powers. To measure political affinity
to the main Western powers, we first extract data from
Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2017) on a country’s ideal-
point, a one-dimensional measure of a country’s foreign
policy preferences as revealed in their voting behavior at
the United Nations (for a detailed discussion of the con-
struction of the ideal-points, see Bailey, Strezhnev &
Voeten, 2017). Affinity to the West is then operationa-
lized as the difference between a country’s ideal-point
and the mean ideal-point of the four major Western
powers.14 Consequently, positive (negative) values of
this affinity score would coincide with high (low) polit-
ical affinity to the most important Western powers. We
expect this affinity to positively predict transnational
terrorism. As put by Gaibulloev & Sandler (2019a: 335):
Political affinity offers terrorist groups a means of lash-
ing out at targeted countries’ values by hitting softer
venue countries, espousing or following similar foreign
policy positions. Terrorist attacks based on political
proximity represent ‘attack transference’ to more vulner-
able countries. Such transference makes the most of
terrorists’ limited resources and may have far-reaching
political influence by affecting the foreign policy posi-
tions of many intimidated countries. As a consequence,
affinity-based terrorist attacks may have larger effects
than terrorist attacks directed at grievance-generating
13 In the Online appendix (supplementary 2), we report results using
additional operationalizations of our terrorism index. These findings
mirror those reported in Table III.
14 In the case of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany themselves, we only use the mean ideal-point for the
respective remaining three countries to create the affinity measure.
Note that we drop South Korea and Switzerland from the sample
because both countries only became UN members in 1991 and 2002,
respectively.
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countries, thus making displaced attacks desirable and
cost-effective from the viewpoint of the terrorists.
Indeed, Gaibulloev & Sandler (2019a) find that
countries that are politically close to the major Western
powers are more likely to attract transnational terrorism.
By contrast, we could find no argument in the literature
that political proximity to the West (as revealed in voting
behavior at the United Nations) should affect migration
policy change. Thus, we expect political affinity to the
West to affect migration policy changes only through its
effect on the terrorism index.
Instrumental-variable regression results. Our
instrumental-variable estimates are reported in
Table V. First, these results show that the reduced-
form regression results are as expected, with political
affinity to the West positively predicting transnational
terrorism. The instrument is also sufficiently strong,
as indicated by the F-test statistics surpassing the
threshold of F ¼ 10 usually associated with instru-
ment weakness.
Second, with respect to migration regulations, we find
terrorism to be endogenous, as indicated by the signifi-
cant Wald test of exogeneity of the instrumented
variable, which tests whether the error terms in the
reduced-form and structural equation are correlated
(tests for exogeneity in the context of IV-probit models
are discussed in more detail in Rivers & Vuong, 1988:
358–361). However, there is no evidence that terrorism
leads to more restrictive migration regulations even when
instrumented.
Third, with respect to migration controls, we find that
in an IV-setting higher values of the terrorism index do
not result in more restrictive migration controls, contra-
dicting earlier findings. However, the non-significant
Wald test also indicates that terrorism is not endogenous
in the first place. Thus, an instrumental-variable
approach is not warranted; it will only introduce statis-
tical imprecision without any inferential gains. Conse-
quently, estimating an ordinary probit model is
preferable. The results from standard probit models are
shown in Specifications (2) and (4). These estimates are
in line with our baseline regression results from Table
Table IV. Frequency and ferocity of terrorism and migration policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable !
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Transnational terrorism 1.583 8.562
index (incidents) (8.263) (7.936)
Transnational terrorism –0.084 0.214**
index (wounded) (0.170) (0.075)
Transnational terrorism 0.068 0.345*
index (killed) (0.428) (0.170)
Policy diffusion 2.820** 2.785** 2.777** 2.384** 2.056* 2.060*
(0.889) (0.874) (0.873) (0.879) (1.009) (1.010)
Left-wing government 0.560* 0.568* 0.563* –0.078 –0.056 –0.055
(0.276) (0.277) (0.275) (0.335) (0.339) (0.339)
Right-wing government 0.340 0.355 0.344 –0.518* –0.485* –0.482*
(0.246) (0.257) (0.256) (0.244) (0.242) (0.242)
Government size 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.023 0.020 0.020
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Unemployment 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.078** 0.080** 0.081**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Per capita income 0.947** 0.942** 0.940** 0.496** 0.467** 0.469**
(0.206) (0.205) (0.204) (0.169) (0.161) (0.161)
Democratic participation 0.926 0.907 0.937 –0.011 0.056 0.039
(1.481) (1.488) (1.476) (1.087) (1.093) (1.091)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.041 0.040 0.040
No. of observations 827 827 827 827 827 827
Constant not reported. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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II. In particular, we find that higher values of the
terrorism index translate into a greater likelihood that
migration controls are tightened also in the (non-IV)
probit setting, corroborating our main findings
reported in Tables II to IV.
Robustness. As a robustness check, in the Online
appendix we report and discuss results from an alterna-
tive IV-approach, where terrorism is instrumented by
local military capacity. These alternative IV-estimates
strongly mirror those reported in the main text.
Period-specific effects
Our analysis covers both the era of left-wing transnational
terrorism (Cold War era) and religiously-motivated (Isla-
mist) transnational terrorism (post-Cold War era). As an
extension to our baseline results, we examine whether the
effect of transnational terrorism exposure on migration
policies differs between these time periods. Potentially,
migration policy change is more responsive to terrorism
after the end of the Cold War due to Islamist terrorism
(especially by Al-Qaeda-like groups) having become more
prominent, where this type of terrorism (i) tends to be more
lethal and likely to target civilians (Piazza, 2009) and (ii) is
more likely to provoke xenophobia and feelings of threat
due to its inherent ‘otherness’ (Legewie, 2013). This may
have contributed to a greater securitization of migration in
the 1990s15 and 2000s.
Table V. Instrumental-variable estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ! Migration regulation Migration regulation Migration controls Migration controls
Transnational terrorism index 0.163 –0.003 0.032 0.015**
(0.096) (0.012) (0.085) (0.006)
Policy diffusion 1.603** 1.944** 0.997 1.013
(0.518) (0.535) (0.591) (0.575)
Left-wing government 0.446** 0.567** –0.085 –0.080
(0.156) (0.175) (0.243) (0.241)
Right-wing government 0.245 0.417* –0.323 –0.312
(0.140) (0.172) (0.188) (0.177)
Government size 0.033** 0.024 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013)
Unemployment 0.035* 0.038* 0.042* 0.043*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Per capita income 0.597** 0.651** 0.245* 0.249*
(0.089) (0.122) (0.108) (0.103)
Democratic participation 0.085 –0.387 0.322 0.298
(0.613) (0.815) (0.918) (0.889)
Reduced-form results
Proximity to the West t–1 1.443** 1.397**
(0.452) (0.421)
F-test statistic 10.17** 11.02**
(Prob.>F) (0.00) (0.00)
Wald exogeneity test 19.58** 0.05
(Prob.>2) (0.00) (0.83)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 769 769 769 769
Reduced-form results for other covariates not reported. Null hypothesis of Wald exogeneity test: no endogeneity. Ordinary probit estimates in
Specifications (2) and (4). Constant not reported. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
15 Examples of religiously motivated transnational terrorism before
the 9/11 attacks include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by
Islamist fundamentalists from Kuwait, Jordan, and other countries, as
well as the 1995 bombings in Paris and Lyon committed by the
Algerian GIA.
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We report our empirical findings regarding period-
specific effects of transnational terrorism on migration pol-
icies in Table VI. First, there is no strong evidence that the
effect of transnational terrorism on broader migration reg-
ulations is different for the Cold War and post-Cold War
eras. Second, and more interestingly, we find that migra-
tion controls were tightened in response to transnational
terrorism only after the end of the Cold War. The latter
finding may indeed suggest that the relative dominance of
Islamist terrorism after the end of the Cold War has
resulted in stronger security concerns and greater public
demand for corresponding migration policy responses.
Domestic terrorism
Between 1980 and 2010, many countries in our sample
experienced terrorist campaigns not only by transna-
tional but also by domestic terrorist groups (e.g. Euskadi
Ta Askatasuna in Spain, the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê
in Turkey, and the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodrı́guez
in Chile).16 Using data from Enders, Sandler &
Gaibulloev (2011) and Gaibulloev & Sandler (2019b),
we find that between 1980 and 2010 the countries in our
sample saw over 9,000 domestic terrorist attacks. By
contrast, according to ITERATE the same countries saw
only approximately 1,900 ‘imported’ transnational ter-
rorist attacks during the same time period. In other
words, domestic terrorism was much more pronounced
during our period of observation.
Domestic terrorism may also have had policy conse-
quences. Most importantly, instruments of migration
control (e.g. the collection of biometric information or
the issue of identification documents) may have been
introduced primarily to combat domestic rather than
transnational terrorism. Possibly, then, the effect of past
experience with transnational terrorism on migration
control restrictiveness – as evidenced in Tables II to V
– might be spurious.
To analyze whether domestic terrorist activity indeed
also affects migration policymaking, we first create a
domestic terrorism index as in Equations (1) and (2),
using data on the number of domestic terrorist incidents
and the number of individuals killed and wounded in
these attacks from Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011)
and Gaibulloev & Sandler (2019b). We then use this
domestic terrorism index to run empirical models as in
Equation (3).
We report our empirical results in Table VII. First,
these results suggest that domestic terrorism does not
increase the likelihood of stricter migration controls,
while more transnational terrorism still does. This reaf-
firms our main finding that greater social exposure to
transnational (but not domestic) terrorism results in
stricter migration controls. Second, there is evidence that
more domestic (but not transnational) terrorism results
in a tightening of migration regulations, especially after
the end of the Cold War. The latter finding may be due
to the increased radicalization of domestic actors that
nevertheless enjoy transnational ties (e.g. citizens with
a migrant and Islamist background) in the 1990s and
2000s; governments may have implemented stricter
migration regulations to impair such radicalization pro-
cesses, for example by curbing the further growth of
communities with radicalization potential. While it is
beyond the scope of this article, a closer examination
of the nexus between migration policymaking and
Table VI. Effects in Cold War and post-Cold War eras
(1) (2)
Dependent variable !
Migration
regulation
Migration
controls
Transnational terrorism index 0.406 –0.422
[1980–91] (0.244) (0.685)
Transnational terrorism index –0.008 0.027**
[1992–2010] (0.021) (0.008)
Policy diffusion 3.110** 1.779
(0.924) (0.959)
Left-wing government 0.573* –0.054
(0.271) (0.341)
Right-wing government 0.341 –0.469
(0.253) (0.245)
Government size 0.027 0.022
(0.033) (0.021)
Unemployment 0.051 0.081**
(0.027) (0.029)
Per capita income 0.947** 0.468**
(0.205) (0.156)
Democratic participation 0.958 0.045
(1.469) (1.085)
Time controls Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.075 0.041
No. of observations 827 827
Constant not reported. All explanatory variables lagged by one year.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
16 Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev (2011: 321) define domestic
terrorism as ‘homegrown in which the venue, target, and
perpetrators are all from the same country’. Thus, domestic
terrorism has direct consequences for only the venue country, its
institutions, citizens, property, and policies.
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domestic terrorism may be a fruitful area of future
research considering our findings.
Conclusion
We study the effect of transnational terrorism on migra-
tion policy change for a sample of 30 OECD countries
between 1980 and 2010. Creating a novel index of trans-
national terrorism memory (which reflects a country’s
past experience with transnational terrorism), we find
that a greater exposure to transnational terrorism – espe-
cially when it is ferocious and occurring after the end of
the Cold War – is associated with moves towards stricter
migration controls, but not with stricter migration reg-
ulations. Our main finding provides partial support for
the notion of a securitization of immigration. We show
that terrorism affects migration control mechanisms
through which the adherence to migration regulations
is monitored but not the regulations themselves. Policy
responses to transnational terrorism are thus surgical
rather than sweeping. We argue that governments may
implement more restrictive migration controls during
times of (perceived) terrorism risk because they want
to kill two birds with one stone. First, stricter immigra-
tion controls may indeed effectively reduce terrorism, for
example by increasing the costs of carrying out attacks
from abroad. Second, by introducing more controls a
government can signal political resolve and avoid elec-
toral defeat when terrorism undermines perceptions of
public safety and economic stability.
However, more restrictive immigration policies may
also come at a price. For example, they may involve high
implementation and maintenance costs (e.g. increased
public spending on immigration and enforcement agen-
cies) that can put a strain on public coffers. Additionally,
more restrictive controls may disincentivize labor immi-
gration, potentially producing further long-run costs for
ageing OECD economies. As a matter of fact, the poten-
tial adverse effect of stricter regulations on the labor
supply and – subsequently – economic growth may
Table VII. Domestic terrorism and migration policy change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable !
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
regulation
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Migration
controls
Domestic terrorism index 0.194** 0.198** –0.110 –0.120
(0.061) (0.062) (0.098) (0.100)
Domestic terrorism index 0.140 –0.433
[1980–91] (0.474) (0.285)
Domestic terrorism index 0.201** –0.091
[1992–2010] (0.063) (0.107)
Transnational terrorism index –0.014 –0.014 0.029** 0.029**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009)
Policy diffusion 2.745** 2.751** 2.698** 2.122* 2.097* 1.796
(0.871) (0.874) (0.906) (1.025) (1.026) (1.066)
Left-wing government 0.516* 0.519* 0.517* –0.019 –0.026 –0.026
(0.247) (0.248) (0.245) (0.342) (0.343) (0.347)
Right-wing government 0.291 0.300 0.298 –0.432 –0.451 –0.456
(0.226) (0.234) (0.237) (0.244) (0.245) (0.249)
Government size 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Unemployment 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.086** 0.086** 0.090**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
Per capita income 0.945** 0.947** 0.944** 0.483** 0.478** 0.471**
(0.174) (0.174) (0.177) (0.164) (0.162) (0.157)
Democratic participation 1.946 1.939 1.940 –0.363 –0.358 –0.411
(1.334) (1.334) (1.337) (1.160) (1.161) (1.183)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.041 0.041 0.042
No. of observations 827 827 827 827 827 827
Constant not reported. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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constitute an important factor constraining incentives
for office-holders to overly tighten migration policy in
response to transnational terrorism. A careful inspection
of such potential trade-offs ought to be highly relevant to
policymakers, while also informing future research on
the nexus between terrorism and migration policies.
Replication data
The dataset and do-file for the empirical analysis in this
article, as well as the Online appendix, can be found at
http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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(2017) Measuring immigration policies: The IMPIC data-
base. European Political Science 16(1): 79–98.
Huddy, Leonie; Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber & Gallya
Lahav (2005) Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism
policies. American Journal of Political Science 49(3):
593–608.
Legewie, Joscha (2013) Terrorist events and attitudes toward
immigrants: A natural experiment. American Journal of
Sociology 118(5): 1199–1245.
Long, J Scott & Jeremy Freese (2006) Regression Models for
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. College Sta-
tion, TX: Stata Press.
Meierrieks, Daniel & Thomas Gries (2013) Causality between
terrorism and economic growth. Journal of Peace Research
50(1): 91–104.
Messina, Anthony M (2014) Securitizing immigration in the
age of terror. World Politics 66(3): 530–559.
Mickolus, Edward F; Todd Sandler, Jean M Murdoch & Peter
A Flemming (2016) International Terrorism: Attributes of
Terrorist Events, 1968–2016. Dunn Loring, VA: Vinyard
Software.
Helbling & Meierrieks 579
Natter, Katharina; Mathias Czaika & Hein de Haas (2018)
The determinants of migration policies. Does the political
orientation of governments matter? IMI Working Paper
Series 117 (https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publica
tions/the-determinants-of-migration-policies-does-the-
political-orientation-of-governments-matter).
Neumayer, Eric; Thomas Plümper & Mariaelisa Epifanio
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